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LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to this proceeding are: John A. Fericks and C. Kurt Hoffman,
plaintiffs/appellants; and Joe Goodman and Pentad Properties, Inc., defendants/appellees.
In addition to the parties to this appeal, the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust and Carlos R. Soffe,
Vaughn C. Soffe and Shirla S. Holt, as Trustees of the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, were
named as defendants. Finally, the plaintiffs listed a John Doe Buyer as a defendant. This
party was never identified or served. The Lucy Ann Soffe Trust and its trustees are not
parties to this appeal.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, concluding, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs could prove no exceptions to the
statute of frauds applied to warrant enforcement of the oral modification of REPC?
(Issue preserved in the Record at 64-83; 165-193; 194-208; 271-77; 291-95)
Standard of Review: On appeal, the appellate court reviews the facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled to summary
judgment presents a question of law, the appellate court grants no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See Higgins. 855 P.2d at 235;
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
II A. Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues
of material fact which would excuse the plaintiffs from the requirement that any
modifications to the Real Estate Purchase Contract be in writing signed by the parties?
(Issue preserved in Record at 64-83; 165-193; 194-208; 271-77; 291-95)
1

Standard of Review: No deference is given to a trial court's legal
conclusions which are reviewed for correctness. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Springville
Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P2d 332.
IIB. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 56(f)
extension to allow plaintiffs to conduct basic discovery for the purpose of determining if
Appellees Pentad and Goodman (and the Soffe Defendants through Pentad/Goodman as
their agents) were engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or other artifice to deprive the
plaintiffs of rights and benefits under their own Real Estate Purchase Contract with the
Soffe Defendants? (Issue preserved in Record at 165-193; 194-208; 264-65; 271-77;
291-95)
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for
additional discovery time is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard based upon
whether the discovery sought by the moving party would be legally relevant to the
resolution of issues on summary judgment. CampbelL Maack & Sessions, v. Debry, 2001
UT App 397, f6, 38 P.3d 984; American Towers Owners Assn. v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 930
P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); Holmes v. American States Ins. Co.. 2000 UT App 85, 1 P.3d
552.
III.

After ruling the statute of frauds barred any oral modification of the
2

REPC, did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims of fraud, breach of duty and
intentional interference with contract, concluding the statute of frauds precluded these
causes of action as well? (Issue preserved in Record dt. 291-95; 320-21; 322-25)
Standard of Review: No deference is given to a trial court's legal
conclusions which are reviewed for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better
Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P2d 332.
IV.

Did the trial court err in determining that Goodman and Pentad were

entitled to attorney fees and costs under the REPC as the agents of the seller? (Issue
preserved in Record at 373-74; 375-86; 421-22; 423-24; 430-34)
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Selvage v. J. J. Johnson &
Assocs.. 910 P.2d. 1252 (Utah App. 1996).
V-VI. Was the award of attorney fees to Goodman and Pentad supported by
sufficient evidence, properly allocated to covered claims, reasonable and supported by
findings of fact after independent review by the trial court? (Issue preserved in Record at
373-74; 375-86; 421-22; 423-24; 430-34)
Standard of Review: Where attorney fee are awarded on summary
judgment, the undisputed material facts must establish as a matter of law that the
3

prevailing party is entitled to the award, the amount of the award is reasonable and the
award is properly attributed to covered claims. See Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah
1998); Taylor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Court App. 1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND
REGULATIONS
Resolution of the case necessarily involves application of the statute of
frauds, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, which provides:
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands,
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing."
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from an Order Granting Summary Judgment which
purportedly resolved all claims against all defendants, and from the Findings/Judgment
awarding attorney fees and costs to Pentad and Goodman. Plaintiffs are not appealing the
Summary Judgment on their claims directly against defendants Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, and
the Trust's Trustees, Carlos R. Soffe, Vaughn C. Soffe, and Shirla S. Holt (the "Soffe
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Defendants"). Nor are plaintiffs appealing the Trial Court's award of attorney fees and
costs to the Soffe Defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") for purchase
of undeveloped commercial property in Salt Lake County, Utah. Plaintiffs (C. Kurt
Hoffman ("Hoffman") and John Fericks ("Fericks")) were the buyers for a purchase price
of $313,000. The Soffe defendants were the sellers. Defendant/Appellee Joe Goodman
("Goodman") was the sellers' real estate agent. Defendant/Appellee Pentad Properties,
Inc. ("Pentad") was the real estate brokerage which employed Goodman. (R. at 54-55,
77-82) A $5,000 earnest money payment was deposited by plaintiffs with Pentad on
February 1, 2002 when the parties signed the REPC. An additional $10,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposit was due on April 6, 2002. (R. at 55, 77-82).
In a telephone call between Hoffman and Goodman on March 26, 2002,
plaintiffs arranged a 30-day extension of the April 6, 2002 deadline with Goodman, as
agent for the sellers. Goodman committed to create a written memorial of the extension.
(R. at 195-97) During this same conversation, Goodman discussed a possible tenant to
lease space in the building plaintiffs proposed to build on the subject property. (R. at 196)
On April 5, 2002, Hoffman again called Goodman regarding the extension. Goodman
5

apologized for not confirming the extension and vowed to care of it that day. (R. at 196)
The next day, April 6, 2002, plaintiffs, in reliance on Goodman's representations, did not
tender the second earnest money payment-although they were willing and able to make
the payment at that time. (R. at 199, 273-74)
On April 8, 2002, the very next business day after the April 6, 2002
deadline, Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, notified plaintiffs that the
deadline for the additional earnest money had expired and sellers considered the REPC
void. (R. at 197,207, 271-74) At this point, however, the sellers, through Goodman and
Pentad, did not indicate another buyer had been lined up to buy the property. (R. at 207)
After receiving the April 8 letter voiding the deal, Fericks inquired about the extension.
During these conversations with Goodman and Carlos Soffe, the seller, plaintiffs learned
that sellers, with the assistance of Goodman and Pentad, had been negotiating with new
buyers who were offering more money and a quicker closing date. (R. at 273) More
importantly, the statements of Goodman and Pentad, and other related circumstances,
suggested that the negotiations with the later buyer were occurring contemporaneous with
the requests for an extension of the April 6 deadline. (R, at 273)
Based on the curious timing of the new buyer and the apparent
misrepresentations of Goodman and Pentad, plaintiffs filed their Complaint on May 6,
6

2002, and tendered the additional earnest money by deposit with the Court Clerk pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1. (R. at 1-17) The Complaint sought the following relief
against the indicated defendants:
i.

Against Pentad and Goodman: breach of real estate

professional statutory and common law standards of care with regards to rights of third
parties (R. at 4-5);
ii.

Against Pentad and Goodman: intentional interference with

contractual and economic interests (R. at 5);
iii.

Against Pentad and Goodman: fraud and/or misrepresentation

regarding the 30-day extension on the deadline for the additional earnest money deposit
(R. at 5);
iv.

Against Soffe Defendants: specific performance under the

v.

Against Soffe Defendants: breach of contract (R. at 5);

vi.

Against a John Doe Buyer: for declaratory judgment of no

REPC (R. at 5);

interest in the property as competing buyer (R. at 5).
Plaintiffs sought relief variously against the defendants including: damages, specific
performance, punitive and exemplary damages, and statutory damages under Utah Code
7

Ann. §61-2-17(4). (R. at 5-6)
In very short order, defendants filed motions to dismiss (R. at 27-53); the
plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (R. at 54-60); defendants answered the amended
complaint (R. at 114-26; 130-42; 143-46); defendants filed motions for summary
judgment (R. at 84-113,127-29); plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on the legal
merits and requested a Rule 56(f) extension for additional time to conduct discovery (R.
at 165-93); Plaintiffs issued requests for production of documents to Goodman and
Pentad and noticed the deposition of Pentad's principle broker, Greg Shields, for August
29, 2002. (R. at 264-65) A hearing was held by the trial court on the Motions for
Summary Judgment on August 19, 2002. (R, at 266-67, 284) Based upon the language in
the REPC which required all changes to be in writing signed by parties, the trial court
announced summary judgment in favor of all defendants. (R. at 284)
Objections followed with regard to the form and scope of the proposed
Order submitted to the trial court which covered not only the claims brought directly
under the REPC, but also the common law and statutory claims, particularly against
Pentad and Goodman. (R. at 291-95) In spite of these objections, on September 30, 2002
the trial court entered the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment. It disposed of
all claims against all defendants. (R. at 320-21, 322-25)
8

Applications for attorney fees and costs wrere subsequently granted over the
objections of plaintiffs that argued (1) defendants Pentad and Goodman were not parties
to the REPC and had no statutory or contractual basis upon which to be awarded legal
expenses; (2) the claims asserted against Pentad and Goodman were not contractual in
nature and did not arise out of the REPC; and (3) the requested fees were not reasonable
or supported by proper evidence and findings. (R. at 326-39,340-61, 362-64,365-69,
373-74,375-86,396-417,421-22,423-24,428-29,430-34,435-37)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in three primary respects: (1)
granting summary judgment, (2) disposing of all claims against Goodman and Pentad
based on the statute of frauds, and (3) awarding Goodman and Pentad attorney fees.
Specifically, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that the oral agreement
extending the deadline is enforceable as a matter of law. Additionally, plaintiffs
submitted sworn affidavits which indicate that material issues of fact exist, precluding
summary judgment. Plaintiffs timely submitted discovery requests to Goodman and
Pentad requesting information to support their claims. Plaintiffs requested the trial court
grant them time to conduct this basic discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). This request was
denied, and plaintiffs had no opportunity to conduct basic discovery.
9

On the issues of the award of attorney fees to Goodman and Pentad,
plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in finding that Goodman and Pentad were entitled
to attorney fees under the REPC. Goodman and Pentad are not parties or even third-party
beneficiaries of the REPC. In addition to having no contractual or statutory basis for
receiving fees, the award of attorney fees was not properly supported nor reasonable
given the length and complexity of this litigation.
ARGUMENT
I.

Where the Parties Have an Enforceable Contract that Satisfies the Statute of
Frauds, the Statute of Frauds Does Not Preclude a Subsequent Oral
Modification of a Non-Material Term of the Contract.
The trial court erred in concluding that under the Statute of Frauds an oral

agreement modifying when a second earnest money deposit was due was unenforceable
as a matter of law. Defendants argued and the trial court ruled1 that because the contract
was for real property the statute of frauds required any oral modification of the contract to
be in writing to be enforceable. Although the statute of frauds may apply to any alteration
or modification of a written contract, "a recognized and accepted exception to the statute

1

The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law in granting defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing on defendants' motion, the court received no
evidence and the arguments by counsel followed their briefs. Accordingly, plaintiffs will refer to
defendants' arguments below because these arguments are the legal bases for the court's grant of
summary judgment.
10

of frauds provides, '"[i]f a party has changed his position by performing an oral
modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the party to found a claim upon the
original agreement^] . . . the modified agreement should be held valid."'" Fisher v.
Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (applying exception to statute of
frauds to contract for purchase of real estate) (quoting White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1301
(Utah 1983); Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 201, 48 P.2d 489, 492
(1935), aff d on reh'g, 88 Utah 213, 53 P.2d 1153 (1936)). This rule of law applies to all
contracts, "even if the agreement being modified unambiguously indicates that any
modifications must be in writing." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,113 n.4,40
P.3d 1119 (citing Prince v. R.C. Tolman Const. Co., Inc., 610 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah
1980)). Utah case law recognizes that parties frequently orally modify contracts that must
be in writing, and, in certain circumstances, these oral modifications are enforceable
notwithstanding statutory or contractual provisions to the contrary. See Allen v. Kingdon,
723 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986) (recognizing that oral modification of real estate
contract may be enforceable where it would be inequitable based on parties' performance
under contract and oral modification); Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1176-77; Holt v. Katsanevas,
854 P.2d 575, 579-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (oral modification of real estate contract
could be enforced notwithstanding statute of frauds and trial court should not have
11

granted summary judgment on the issue).
In Fisher, the parties entered into a contract for the sale of real property.
According to the buyers of the property, the seller orally agreed to postpone annual
escrow payments of $10,000. See Fisher. 907 P.2d at 1174-76. After the seller died, the
seller's heirs argued that any oral agreement to postpone the escrow payments was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed
and determined that the oral modification was enforceable because the buyers had
changed their position and partially performed on the contract in reliance on the oral
agreement. See id. at 1176-77.
Like the buyers in Fisher, plaintiffs in this case changed their position and
continued to perform under the contract. Specifically, the plaintiffs had already tendered
one earnest money payment on the contract. Additionally, plaintiffs were continuing to
perform on the contract by taking the following actions: (1) completing their due
diligence as set forth in the REPC; (2) working with the City of South Jordan for approval
of development plans for the property, i.e. feasibility; (3) assembling investor money to
fund the project; and (4) arranging surveys and architectural planning for the site. (R. at
195-98) Due to delays with the City of South Jordan, plaintiffs sought an extension for
the payment of the second earnest money payment. Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of
12

the sellers, agreed to this extension. Importantly, the requested extension was not due to
plaintiffs' inability to tender the required earnest money, concerns about feasibility of the
plans or doubts about buying the land. (R. at 199, 271-74)
In reliance on the oral agreement, plaintiffs did not tender the earnest
money payment by the deadline set forth in the REPC and continued with their feasibility
study. As noted, plaintiffs were willing and able to tender the second earnest money
deposit by the required deadline. (R. at 199, 274). As further corroboration of this fact,
plaintiffs tendered the money to court in conjunction with filing the complaint on May 6,
2002. (R. at 4). A few days after the deadline, Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the
sellers, sent a letter indicating the contract was void due to the failure to tender the second
earnest money agreement. Shortly after this letter, plaintiffs learned that the sellers, using
Goodman and Pentad, had already arranged for a different buyer for the land at a higher
price. Accordingly, plaintiffs lost their opportunity to purchase the land and wasted their
time and effort in conducting a feasibility study.
Defendants argued the rule of law in R.T. Nielsen and Prince was not
applicable because those cases did not involve a contract which needed to satisfy the
statute of frauds. Instead, defendants argued Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah 1996);
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Wardlev Corp. Better
13

Homes & Gardens v. Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) controlled the issue
and required any oral modification to be in writing to be enforceable. Indeed, in the
circumstances presented in these cases, enforcement of the purported oral modification is
not warranted. For example, in Stangl, the issue was whether promissory estoppel
precluded the defense of statute of frauds. See Stangl, 948 P.2d at 360. First, the Court
of Appeals discussed prior Utah case law on the issue. See id. at 360-65. Specifically,
the Court of Appeals found that Utah Supreme Court had "recognized the limited
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds . . . . " Id. at 362
(citing McKinnon v. The Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Dav Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974)). The Stangl and McKinnon opinions
recognized that '"a mere promise to execute a written contract and a subsequent refusal to
do so is insufficient to create an estoppel....'" Id. at 363 (quoting McKinnon, 529 P.2d
at 436-37). Because the parties in Stangl had never entered into a written lease
agreement, the court concluded the statute of frauds was available as a defense.
In contrast to Stangl where the issue was whether an oral agreement to enter
into a contract was enforceable, the buyer and seller in this case had entered into written
agreement which fully satisfied the statute of frauds. The analysis in Stangl has no
relevance to whether or not an oral agreement to modify a non-material term of a valid
14

written contract is enforceable. Stangl addresses the statute of frauds in the context of
negotiations prior to the parties actually entering into a contract.
On the other hand, in both Burgess and Mills the parties had entered into
enforceable written agreements. See Burgess. 810 P.2d at 476-77; Mills. 929 P.2d at 36162. In Burgess, the parties had entered into a written listing agreement for a six-month
period. See Burgess. 810 P.2d at 476-77. Under the agreement, if the realtor found a
buyer for the property, the seller would owe the realtor a commission. The day before the
expiration of the listing agreement the realtor claimed the seller orally agreed to extend
the listing agreement for an additional six-months. The Court of Appeals adopted the
analysis of an Ohio court which recognized the oral modification was a "new contract"
and modified an "essential term" of the contract. See id. at 478. Furthermore, the Utah
Supreme Court had previously recognized the "unyielding duty upon real estate agents
and brokers to obtain written listing agreements or face the risk of nonpayment." Id at
477. Based on that important policy concern with respect to real estate commission
contracts and the fact that the oral modification went to a material term which essentially
created a new contract, the court applied the statute of frauds and found the oral
agreement unenforceable. See id. at 478.
Unlike Burgess, the parties did not orally modify an essential term of the
15

contract or create a new contract. In this case, the plaintiffs secured an oral agreement
from Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, for an extension of time for tendering
a second earnest money payment. This extension did not affect the closing date or final
payment price for the land. None of the essential terms of the contract (i.e. the legal
description of the subject property, the parties to the contract, the sale price, and date and
means of final payment) was modified or extended. It is well-established that an oral
modification to a non-essential term of a contract required to be in writing is enforceable
notwithstanding the statute of frauds' requirements. See, e.g.. Allen, 723 P.2d at 396
(oral agreement that modifies material term of contract must be in writing); Holt, 854
P.2d at 579 (same); James H. Moore & Associates Realty, Inc. v. Arrowhead At Vail, 892
P.2d 367, 372 (Col. Ct. App. Div. Ill 1995) (contract subject to statute of frauds may be
orally modified "so long as the oral modification does not relate to a material condition of
that contract"); Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757, 764 (10th Cir. 1977) (oral modification to
non-essential term of contract is enforceable notwithstanding statute of frauds). Stated
differently, an oral modification of a contract subject to the statute of frauds is allowed so
long as the modification does not affect a material term thus causing the underlying
contract to not satisfy the statute of frauds.
The date upon which the additional earnest money deposit of $10,000 was
16

due is not a material part of the REPC. The material elements of a contract for the sale of
real property include the identity of the parties, the identity of the property, the agreed
closing and the agreed price. See, e.g., English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613,
616 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (setting out essential parts of lease contract as property identity,
term, rental amount and period); Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell. 1999 UT App 55, f 12,
976 P.2d 1218 (noting essential terms of option contract include price and property
description). Importantly, this modification did not affect the stated closing date in the
REPC of February 15, 2003. In this case, the REPC, with the oral modification, was still
enforceable and still satisfied the statute of frauds.
Finally, defendants cited Mills for further support that courts will not
enforce oral agreements. In Mills, the lessee of a condominium sought to exercise ail
option to purchase the condominium. The lessor argued that the lessee's attempt to
exercise the option orally was insufficient and that any oral agreement to extend the
deadline to exercise the option was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. See Mills,
929 P.2d at 361-62. Most of the opinion in Mills addresses whether the lessee's exercise
of the option was sufficient. See id. at 362-364. In addressing whether the oral
agreement to extend the deadline was enforceable, the court stated the recognized rule
that the statute of frauds requires a written agreement to extend an option deadline, in the
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absence of an estoppel. See id. at 364. Accordingly, Mills does not alter or contradict the
analysis set forth in Fisher. Allen. Holt or Stangl. Because the lessee failed to argue
estoppel, the trial court correctly ruled that any oral agreement to extend the option
deadline was unenforceable, and the appellate court could not consider whether any
equitable considerations warranted an exception to the statute of frauds. See id. at 364.
In this case, plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was improper for
several reasons: (1) the parties orally agreed to modify the deadline for the second earnest
money agreement, (2) the oral agreement was enforceable because it modified a nonmaterial term of the REPC; and (3) the defendants relied to their detriment on the oral
modification by continuing to pursue their development plans for the property, continuing
their dialogue with the City of South Jordan and not tendering the second earnest money
payment by the deadline; and (4) enforcement of the contract without the oral
modification would be inequitable based on plaintiffs change in position in reliance on
the oral agreement. C£ Madsen v. Anderson. 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983) (law abhors
forfeiture of property and forfeiture is disfavored where notice to a buyer is either
uncertain as to required future performance or misleads buyer into thinking forfeiture will
not be enforced).
As the above authorities provide, defendants were not entitled to judgment
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as a matter of law on the issue of the statute of frauds. Utah law provides for clear
exceptions to the statute of frauds. First, an oral modification may be enforced when it
does not affect a material term of the contract. In this case, the REPC was still a valid
and enforceable contract with the oral modification. Second, an oral modification may be
enforced when a party has changed its position in reliance on the oral agreement and
partially performed on the contract. Here, plaintiffs had tendered money and were in the
process of conducting a feasibility study. Plaintiffs, in reliance on the agreement, did not
tender the second required payment by the deadline, and based on defendants' subsequent
acts, plaintiffs lost their opportunity to purchase the property. Accordingly, it would be
inequitable to enforce the REPC without the oral modification of the second earnest
money deadline. At the very least, as the above cases indicate and as more fully set forth
in the second argument, the issue of the oral modification, plaintiffs' reliance and change
in position, and the application of the statute of frauds present factual issues which would
preclude a grant of summary judgment.
II.

Given the Disputed Issues of Material Fact and the Lack of Opportunity to
Conduct Discovery, the Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was
Error and Denial of Plaintiff s Rule 56(f) Request Was an Abuse of
Discrection.
The application of the statute of frauds to this case presents factual issues
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precluding summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued factual issues existed, promptly served
discovery requests on Goodman and Pentad and requested time to conduct discovery
under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied plaintiffs'
requests and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, depriving plaintiffs of
the opportunity to investigate their claims.
A.

Resolution of Plaintiffs' Contract Claims Necessarily Required
Determination of Material Issues of Fact.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because disputed issues
of material facts existed. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue
of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The opinion in Holt v.
Katsanevas. 854 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) is instructive on this issue. In Holt, the
parties entered into contract for the sale of real property. The parties subsequently orally
modified the contract. See id. at 579. Although neither party denied entering into the oral
agreement, the terms of the agreement were disputed. The seller argued that oral
agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. See id. In reversing the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the seller, the Court of Appeals stated: "Therefore,
if we conclude that the parties genuinely dispute the terms of their oral agreement and the
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dispute is material because plaintiffs could enforce the version of oral agreement they
describe, we must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs."
Id. at 580. Furthermore, the court stated: "Plaintiffs could establish materiality by
proving that its version of the disputed oral agreement could be found enforceable as a
matter of law." Id. The court went on to reverse the grant of summary judgment to allow
plaintiffs to fully present their claims because plaintiffs' allegations indicated disputed
issues of material fact. See id. at 580-81.
Although Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, vigorously dispute
entering into any oral agreements with plaintiffs to extend the deadline, the fact that the
parties in Holt did not dispute an oral agreement was made does not distinguish that case
from the present for two reasons: (1) on appeal, this court must view the facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party which means this court on
appeal must accept that the parties did enter into an oral modification; and (2) the
defendant in Holt, like defendants in this case, argued any oral modification was
unenforceable as a matter of law. The court in Holt faced the same issue as presented
here: Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment finding the statute of
frauds rendered an oral modification of a contract for real property unenforceable.
Under Holt, if plaintiffs can prove a set of facts which would support an
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enforceable oral modification, summary judgment is not appropriate. In this case,
plaintiffs have submitted sworn affidavits alleging an oral modification of a contract
which excuses them from tendering the second earnest money payment by the deadline
set forth in the contract. (R. at 194-208; 271-77) Additionally, plaintiffs attached records
and correspondence which tends to corroborate their sworn testimony and the allegations
that an oral agreement to extend the deadline was made. (R. at 194-208; 271-77)
Plaintiffs have not alleged any additional modifications of any material terms of the
contract, such as the parties, the property, the price or the closing date. Finally, plaintiffs
have alleged facts to show a change in their position and continued performance based on
their reliance on the oral agreement. Specifically, plaintiffs' performed on the contract by
taking the following steps: (1) completing their due diligence as set forth in the REPC; (2)
working with the City of South Jordan for approval of development plans for the
property; (3) assembling investor money to fund the project; and (4) arranging surveys
and architectural planning for the site. (R. at 195-98) These allegations are sufficient to
show continued and partial performance under the contract and to create a disputed issue
of material fact. Furthermore, if proven at trial, these facts are sufficient to make the oral
agreement enforceable. Plaintiffs' affidavits indicate disputed issues of material fact, and
accordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.
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B.

Because Plaintiffs' Claims Were Viable as a Matter of Law and
Plaintiffs Served Discovery Requests in a Timely Manner, Denial
of the Rule 56(f) Request to Conduct Discovery Was An Abuse of
Discretion.

The trial court abused its discretion when it granted summary judgment less
than three and one half months after the Complaint was filed and before defendants
discovery responses to plaintiffs' written discovery requests were due. Utah law provides
that "summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since
information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
defeat the motion." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P. 2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). Further, under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is inappropriate where the moving party has exclusive control of the facts. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). "Courts generally construe this rule liberally in favor of the
nonmoving party to allow for adequate discovery that may create genuine issues of fact
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834
P.2d 556, (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (affirming denial of Rule 56(f) request on the basis that
discovery would not have aided plaintiff in proving negligence claim). The Court of
Appeals has articulated two factors that a trial court should examine in ruling on a Rule
56(f) request: "(I) whether the party submitting the motion is merely attempting to gain
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'additional discovery time to uncover purely speculative facts after substantial discovery
has already been conducted,' and (2) 'whether the other party has appropriately responded
to discovery requests.'" Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debrv, 2001 UT App 397,1J9, 38
P.3d 984 (citations omitted).
This action was filed on May 6, 2002 with an Amended Complaint filed on
June 6, 2002. (R. at 1-17; 54-60) On July 22, 2002, plaintiff, without an attorney
planning meeting or scheduling order in place, served discovery on defendants and
noticed a deposition for August 29, 2002. (R. at 264-65) The trial court granted
defendants motion for summary judgment from the bench on August 19, 2002 before
defendants answered plaintiffs' discovery requests. (R. at 284) Defendants moved the
court for a protective order to avoid answering plaintiffs' discovery on August 23, 2002.
(R. at 285-90) The court granted defendants motion for a protective order and entered the
final order disposing of all claims on September 27, 2002. (R. at 320-25)
Presumably, the trial court denied plaintiffs' discovery requests because it
determined plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. See, e.g.. Holmes v. American
States Ins. Co., 2000 UT 85,1ffl26-27, 1 P.3d 552 (rule 56(f) request properly denied
where plaintiff had no claim as a matter of law). As the argument in section one
indicates, however, plaintiffs in this case had a viable claim that the oral agreement was
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enforceable under exceptions to the statute of frauds. Additionally, plaintiffs submitted
sworn affidavits which disputed material issues of fact. Plaintiffs' affidavits set forth
allegations which supported their claims in the Amended Complaint.
In this case, the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request was an
abuse of discretion as it deprived plaintiffs of the opportunity to investigate and develop
their claims. Plaintiffs complied with the substance of Rule 56(f) by indicating what
evidence was sought in its pending discovery and the method for obtaining this
evidence-pending discovery requests. See Campbell. Maack & Sessions, 2001 UT App
397 at ^9. (R. at 178-79) Plaintiffs submitted written discovery and noticed up
depositions. Plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to depose the principal parties of
this litigation to determine and identify the true nature and scope of the agreements
reached after the REPC was executed and to determine the facts relevant to the second
transaction between the Soffe Trust and John Doe Buyer. Since plaintiffs dealt primarily
with Joe Goodman and Pentad and because no depositions or formal discovery occurred
prior to the court's grant of summary judgment, plaintiffs could not submit detailed
affidavits regarding the dealings between the seller and its agent. In fact, plaintiffs prior
to the court's grant of summary judgment did not even know the identity or the terms of
the contract between seller and John Doe Buyer. Plaintiffs should have been allowed to
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conduct at least some initial discovery to prove the allegations as set forth in its
Complaint.
III.

The Statute of Frauds Provides No Basis for Dismissing With Prejudice
Plaintiffs' Claims of Fraud, Breach of Duty and Intentional Interference
With Contract.
After determining the statute of frauds made the oral modification

unenforceable, the trial court erred in disposing of the remainder of plaintiffs' claims
which did not implicate the statute of frauds or require enforcement of the oral
modification to succeed. The trial court ruled the oral modification was unenforceable as
a matter of law, and therefore, the statute of frauds barred all plaintiffs' claims because
each depended in some way on the oral modification being enforceable. The trial court's
legal conclusion that each of plaintiffs' claims was barred as a matter of law is a legal
conclusion reviewed for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v.
CitvofSpringville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P2d 332.
On this issue, the trial court adopted the argument set for in defendants'
response to plaintiffs' objection to the proposed order granting summary judgment. (R. at
320-21). In arguing the court should dispose of all plaintiffs' claims, defendants relied on
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In StangL the Court of
Appeals stated: "'Fraud, generally, cannot be predicated upon the failure to perform a
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promise or contract which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, for the promissor
has not, in a legal sense, made a contract; and therefore, he has the right, both in law and
equity, to refuse to perform." Id. at 362 (quoting McKinnon v. The Corporation of the
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974)).
In both Stangl and McKinnon. the parties had not entered into any contracts. See id. at
357-360; McKinnon. 529 P.2d at 435-36. Accordingly, the court correctly noted an oral
promise to enter into a contract was unenforceable and any claims related to the oral
promise were similarly deficient.
In this case, however, an enforceable written contract, the REPC, existed.
Subsequent to entering into the REPC with sellers, plaintiffs attempted to get an
extension of time to tender the second earnest money payment. The sellers of the
property had a right to receive the payment by the deadline. Based on the representations
of Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, plaintiffs believed that the sellers were
agreeable to payment of the money after the deadline set forth in the contract. On this
point, the Stangl court stated: "'An exception is recognized when a misrepresentation as
to the future operates as an abandonment of an existing right of the party making the
representation, i.e., the promise as to the future conduct must constitute a manifestation
that the promissor will abandon an existing right which he possesses.'" Id. at 362
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(quoting McKinnon. 529 P.2d at 436).
This statement contemplates the exact circumstances of this case. The
sellers had a right under the REPC to receive the second earnest money payment by the
date set forth in the contract. Plaintiffs requested an extension to tender this payment.
Based on the representations made to them, plaintiffs believed sellers were agreeable to
the extension and acted in reliance on the representation. Unbeknownst to plaintiffs,
sellers and their real estate agent were working with other buyers who would pay more
for the property. After the deadline for the second earnest money payment past, plaintiffs
were informed that the sellers considered the REPC void for lack of payment of the
second earnest money payment. If proven, these facts would not implicate the statute of
frauds as they are based on the parties' course of dealing and the rights and obligations set
forth in the REPC. Furthermore, these facts would support claims of breach of duty,
fraud and interference with contract.
IV.

Because Goodman and Pentad Are Not Parties to the REPC, No Basis
Exists for Awarding Them Attorney Fees.
Utah law requires a contractual or statutory basis for recovery of attorney

fees by a successful litigant. See Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993);
Martindale v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (owner/lessor who is not a
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party to construction contract between lessee and contractor can not be liable for attorney
fees based on contract). "'Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness.'" Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 91
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Neither of Goodman nor Pentad are parties to the REPC. They are
identified only in Paragraph 5 as agents for the seller, and in fact, Pentad's effort to
represent the plaintiffs as Buyer under the REPC was explicitly deleted. (R. at 10)
The REPC does provide: "in any action arising out of this Contract, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." In this
sentence, the word "party" has the ordinary meaning associated with a party to the
contract, as used consistently throughout the REPC. There is no justification for reading
the term beyond the four corners of the document to include parties to any litigation
involving the REPC. In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has addressed this issue in
interpreting an attorney fee provision in a real estate sales contract. See Wardley Corp. v.
Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Welsh, the real estate broker, Wardley,
sued the seller of real property for its commission. After prevailing on its request for its
commission, the broker requested its attorney fees as third-party beneficiary of the
purchase agreement between the seller and buyer. See id. at 91-92. The language in
Welsh is identical to the language in the REPC, which awards attorney fees to the
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prevailing party in any action arising out of the contract. See id. at 91.
In analyzing the attorney fee provision, the Court of Appeals recognized
that "'attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable only in accordance with the
explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by contract.5" Id at 92
(citation omitted). The court focused on the word party in the attorney fee provision. In
construing this term, the court stated: "We have examined the contract as a whole and
located the words 'party5 and 'parties' in a variety of provisions. In these contract
provisions, those words are used in a way that can logically refer only to the direct parties
to the contract-Welsh, the seller, and Peterson, the buyer-not to the potentially much
larger group of parties to the litigation growing out of the contract." Id at 92. The court
went on to state: "Harmonizing all the terms of this contract, we conclude the words
'party' and 'parties' refer only to the signatories to the contract-Welsh [seller] and
Peterson [buyer]. Only Welsh [seller] and Peterson [buyer] therefore may enforce the
attorney fees provision against each other." Id 2
At the trial court, Goodman and Pentad attempted to distinguish Welsh by
arguing it had no application because it was an action by the broker against the seller
2

Indeed, the sellers, who are not a party to this appeal, applied for and were properly
awarded their fees by the trial court. Plaintiffs did not object to the basis for awarding fees or the
amount of fees claimed by the sellers.
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rather than an action by the buyer against the seller and its broker. As the analysis in
Welsh indicates, such a distinction is not relevant when interpreting the plain language of
the REPC. Although Goodman and Pentad are referenced as the buyer's agent in the
contract, this reference does not make them parties to the contract. Specifically,
Goodman and Pentad had no rights or obligations under the contract. They simply were
the seller's agent. Their obligation was to facilitate the transaction as directed by their
principle, the sellers. In return, Goodman and Pentad were entitled to receive a
commission on the transaction under a commission agreement entered into between seller
and Goodman and Pentad. The mere fact that Goodman and Pentad were named as
defendants in this litigation does not entitle them to an award of attorney fees.
Additionally, the fact that Goodman and Pentad had an agency relationship
with a party to a contract does not entitle Goodman and Pentad to fees under the contract.
Appellants are not aware of any Utah case law awarding fees to a non-party to a contract
on the basis of an agency relationship to a party to the contract. That Goodman and
Pentad could bind the sellers by virtue of the agency relationship is similarly unavailing.
This agency relationship is common in real estate transactions and is not a basis to make
the real estate agent a party to the purchase contract. The real estate agent's rights and
obligations flow from the listing agreement entered into with the seller. This agreement
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provides the amount of the commission which compensates the real estate agent for
his/her efforts. The listing agreement is not a part of the purchase agreement. Courts
examining the issue of whether a real estate agent/broker are parties to a purchase
contract have found that only the buyer and seller are parties to the contract. See, e.g.,
Welsh, 962 P.2d at 91-92 (only signatories of purchase contract are parties entitled to fees
under contract); Harris v. Richard N. Groves Realty, Inc.. 315 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. Ct.
App. 4th Dis. 1975) (real estate purchase contract contemplates formal party to contract
and real estate broker is not a party); cS, Harwig v. Downey, 56 P.3d 1220, 1221-22
(Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (tenants who were not a party to land purchase contract could not
recover fees under contract as intended beneficiaries). Because Goodman and Pentad are
not parties to the REPC, the trial court erred in awarding them attorney fees.
V.

If Goodman and Pentad Are Parties to the REPC, The Claims Against
Goodman and Pentad Were Not Covered by the REPC.
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding Goodman and Pentad the

entire amount of the requested fees. "'An award of attorney fees must be based on
evidence and supported by findings of fact.'" Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah
1998). A party seeking the award of attorney fees has the burden of producing evidence
to support the requested award. See id. at 55. This evidence must include an allocation
between: (1) time and effort spent on causes of action for which attorney fees are allowed
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by contract or statute; and (2) time and effort spent on causes of action for which there is
no allowance for attorney fees. Id.; see also, R.T. Neilsen Co. v. Cook, 2002 Utah 11,40
P.3d 1119; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). "The trial
court, in turn, must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the
requested fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions." Foote, 962 P.2d at 55.
Goodman and Pentad have made no attempt to allocate the efforts of their
counsel between claims under the REPC and claims outside the REPC. This omission is
most likely because no contractual claims were asserted against Goodman and Pentad,
and therefore there were no fees to allocate to covered claims. The plaintiffs' Complaint,
and their First Amended Complaint, contain six causes of action. The first three, directed
specifically at Goodman and Pentad, are outside the REPC. They are: (1) for breach of
statutory and common law standards of care for real estate agents with regard to the rights
and interests of third parties; (2) for intentional interference with the contractual and
economic interests of plaintiffs vis-a-vis the selling party, the Soffe Trust; and (3) for
fraud or misrepresentation with regard to verbal communications. The Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Causes of action are not directed at Goodman and Pentad at all. They are: (4) for
specific performance against the Soffe Trust requiring it to sell the property to plaintiffs
pursuant to the REPC; (5) in the alternative, for damages against the Soffe Trust for
breach of the REPC; and (6) against the John Doe Buyer for declaratory determination
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that his competing and subsequent purchase agreement was subordinate to the plaintiffs'
REPC with the Soffe Trust.
The causes of action asserted against Goodman and Pentad are not
contractual claims that "arise out o f the REPC. Thus, no contractual or statutory basis
exists for an award of attorney fees on independent claims which rely upon the
enforceability of an oral contract or the reliability of oral representations. Even if
Goodman and Pentad can be construed as "parties" under the REPC, because they have
failed to allocate their fees among covered and uncovered causes of action, there is no
evidentiary basis upon which an award of attorney fees can be made.
VI.

Goodman and Pentad's Requested Fees Are Not Reasonable In Light of the
Length and Complexity of the Litigation.
When determining the reasonableness of fees and expenses, a trial court

should answer four questions:
1.

What legal work was actually performed?

2.
How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute the matter?
3.
Is the attorneys billing rate consistent with the rates customarily
charged in the locality for similar services?
4.
Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?
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Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988).
The principal issue in the present case is the second Dixie/Bracken
factor-how much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately defend
Pentad and Goodman. This factor is an accumulation of a number of analytical questions,
including: the difficulty of the litigation; the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case; the fees customarily charged in the locality for similar services; the amount in
controversy; the result obtained; and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved. See id. at 989.
As a preliminary matter, however, Mr. Shields' rate is not customary for
attorneys in Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Shields started this matter with a rate of $220
which increased to $240, on the high side of local rates, and then finally increased to $265
when he switched firms in the middle of this litigation. (R. at 340-43) No evidence was
submitted to verify that these rates are customary. A comparison of the rate charged by
the seller's counsel, which is admittedly low, highlights the problem with Mr. Shields'
rate. (Compare R. at 340-43 ($220-$265) with R. at 365-66 ($125)). The standard under
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Utah law is not the rate an attorney can charge in the area, but the rate customarily
charged in the area. Mr. Shields may have clients that he can bill at $265/hour, but that
rate is not customary in Utah for routine real property disputes.
Under the circumstances of this case, the total amount of requested fees by
Goodman and Pentad is simply breathtaking for approximately 4-5 months of noncomplex litigation involving no discovery. The initial Complaint in this matter was filed
on May 6, 2002. (R. at 1-17). The court granted summary judgment on August 19, 2002.
(R. at 284) The court's ruling was entered to include all causes of action on September
27, 2002. (R. at 320-21). During that time, no discovery occurred. There was no
document productions or voluntary disclosures, and no attorney planning conference.
The first pleading filed by the Pentad defendants was their May 31, 2002 Motion To
Dismiss. That pleading is based upon interviews of Pentad's owner, Greg Shields
(brother of Pentad's attorney, Jeff Shields), and Pentad's co-defendant and agent, Joe
Goodman, both of whom were available to Pentad's counsel at the touch of a telephone.
The pleading relied upon the review of a six-page standard REPC document. The

36

pleading included some generic research on the legal standard under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The legal authority is cited in the standard annotation of
the Utah Code. The pleading does contain some good research on contract interpretation
and the Statute Of Frauds, but the research is neither extensive nor unduly sophisticated.
Goodman and Pentad next filed an Answer to plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint and an accompanying Motion For Summary Judgment, both on June 21, 2002.
The Answer relied largely on facts fleshed out in the Motion To Dismiss. The
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment substituted the legal
standard for Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in place of the Rule 12(b)(6)
standard, but it is otherwise almost verbatim with the Memorandum in Support of the
Motion To Dismiss.
On July 19, 2002, the Pentad defendants filed a Reply Memorandum In
Support of Motion For Summary Judgment and an Affidavit from Mr. Goodman himself.
The Reply Memorandum, a nineteen-page document, again contains some excellent
research and effective argument, but again most of it is based upon a third pass at the
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basic legal authorities already cited. The Goodman Affidavit is thorough, but the sevenpage document is based principally on Mr. Goodman's review of plaintiffs' allegations
rather than on special investigation and unique drafting effort of Goodman and Pentad's
counsel.
Plaintiffs recognize that Goodman and Pentad's counsel had to prepare for
hearing on August 19th, prepare a proposed Order, and respond to the plaintiffs' Objection
to the Order. Finally, of course, Goodman and Pentad's counsel had to prepare the
Motion For Award Of Attorney Fees, a five-page pleading, and a supporting Affidavit, a
document with three pages of text.
The proposition urged on the Court by Goodman and Pentad is that this
effort is worth $27,699.56. It is not. With regard to the reasonableness of attorney fees,
"what an attorney bills or the number of hours spent on a case is not determinative" of
what is reasonable and appropriate. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d at 990; see
also Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n.10 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). Furthermore, "the trial judge [is] not necessarily compelled to accept such self-
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interested testimony whole cloth and make such an award." Beckstrom v. Beckstrom,
578 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1978).
Another problem with the reasonableness of Goodman and Pentad's
requested attorney fees is that, from the billing statements, they appear to pertain in
several regards to communications and coordination with Pentad's professional insurer
through its adjuster, Samye Hoss. Time spent administering a collateral contractual issue
for Pentad (and presumably for Goodman, Pentad's employee) should not be charged to
the plaintiffs.
All of the foregoing concerns are complicated by the failure to allocate the
specific effort between causes of action which are covered by the contractual attorney fee
clause and those which are not. The decision of Goodman and Pentad to focus on oral
modification of the written contract-the primary point of the claims directed solely at the
sellers-as the lynch pin of the claims against themselves, was effective but it did not
thereby qualify Goodman and Pentad to participate as "parties" for all of the rights and
interests under the REPC. All in all, the trial court was left with an insufficient
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evidentiary basis upon which to decide the appropriate amount of legal expenses, even if
Goodman and Pentad had a contractual right to obtain their recovery.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs request this court reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment on each claim asserted against Goodman and Pentad. A
determination that summary judgment was not proper would necessarily require a reversal
of the award of attorney fees. Also, the court should remand this matter in order to allow
the parties to conduct discovery. In the event this court finds the trial court's grant of
summary judgment was proper, this court should still reverse the trial court's award of
attorney fees as neither Goodman nor Pentad were parties to the REPC which provide the
sole basis for the award. Assuming, the Goodman and Pentad were entitled to attorney
fees, this court should remand the award to comply with Utah law and for entry of a
reasonable award consistent with these principles.
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ADDENDUM

COMMERCIAL-: NlDUSTRIAL-iNVESTMENT

F

L ESTATE PURCHASE CONTR>

This is a iega'ly binding contract. Parties to this contract may agree, in writing, to alter or delete provisions of this contract.
Seek advise from your attorney or tax advisor before entering into a binding contract.
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
The Buyer, C. Kurt Hoffman and John A. Fericks, or their assigns , offers to purchase the Property described below
and delivers as Earnest Money Deposit $5,000.00** in the form of a check to:
E the Brokerage, to be deposited within three business days after Acceptance of this Offer to Purchase by all parties.
a the Title/Escrow Company identified below.
Brokerage or Title/Escrow Company: Pentad Properties, Inc.
Address:
349 S. 200 E. Suite 330
Received By:
Date:
Phone Number:
801-350-0100
(If Title/Escrow Company) for deposit no later than:
Date:
OFFER TO PURCHASE
1.

PROPERTY:

See attached Exhibit "A"

Address:
Approximately 1150 W. South Jordan Parkway, South Jordan, Utah
City, County & State: South Jordan, Salt Lake, Utah
For legal description, see nattached Addendum #
; ta preliminary title report, when available, as provided below.
1.1 INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures presently attached to the
Property. The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale
with warranties as to title:
N/A
M
m
1.2 EXCLUDED ITEMS. These items are excluded from this sale: N/A
2.

PURCHASE PRICE & FINANCING: The Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows:

$5,000.00**

Earnest Money Deposit

S

Loan Proceeds:
a Representing the liability to be assumed by Buyer under an existing assumable loan (a with a
without Seller being released of liability) in this approximate amount with a Buyer a Seller agreeing
to pay any loan transfer and assumption fees. Any net differences between the approximate
balance of the loan shown above and the actual balance at Closing shall then be adjusted in
a Cash a Other:
.
a From new institutional financing on terms no less favorable to the Buyer than the following:
Interest Rate for first period prior to adjustment, if any.
Amortization Period
Term
Other than these, the loan terms shall be the best obtainable under the loan for which the Buyer
applies below.
• From Seller-held financing, as described in the attached Seller Financing Addendum.

$10,000.00**

Other: Additional earnest money due April 6, 2002

$298,000.00

Balance of Purchase Price in cash at closing.

$313t000.00

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

3.
CLOSING: This transaction shall be closed on or before February 15, 2003 . Closing shall occur when: (a)
Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), all documents required by this
Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instruction signed by the Buyer and Seller, and by applicable law; (b) the
moneys required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/title company in the form of
collected or cleared funds; and (c) the deed which the Seller has agreed to deliver under Section 6 has been recorded.
Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half of the escrow Closing fee, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing.
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EXHIBIT A

"axes and assessments for the curr
vear. rents and Interest on assumed oc!ir
ns shai! be prorated as set forth :n
this Section. All deposits on tenancy, ^hall be transferred to Buyer at Closing, h , ations set forth in this Section shall
be made as of a date of Closing; a date of possession; o other
.
4.

POSSESSION: Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within

12

hours after Closing.

5.
CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this Contract, the Listing Agent, Joe Goodman,
Pentad Properties, Inc. , represents B Seller D Buyer and the Selling Agent, -Gieg 3liieIdSrP8fttod Propcrtico.-tne-,
represents D Seller a Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Contract, written disclosure of the agency ^ i - ~
relationship was provided to him/her. ( ) Buyer's Initials (
) Seller's Initials. Pentad Propertiesjnc. to receive 6%
\
commission out of the sale proceeds at closing.
c »-Mn£-l & fapn* I Vfv ^ x ^C/
&
6.
TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE: (a) Seller has, or shall have at Closing, free title to the
Property and agrees to convey such to Buyer by H general D special warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as
warranted under Section 10.6] (b) Seller agrees to pay for and furnish Buyer at Closing, with a current standard form
Owner's policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price; (c) the title policy shall conform with Seller's
obligations under subsections (a) and(b). Unless otherwise agreed under Section 8.4, the commitment shall conform with
the title insurance commitment provided under Section 7.1.
a The Buyer elects to obtain a full-coverage extended ALTA policy of title insurance under 6(b). The cost of this
coverage, above that of a standard Owner's policy, shall be paid for by the a Buyer a Seller. Also, the cost of a fullcoverage ALTA survey shall be paid for by the a Buyer a Seller.

7.

SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER:

7.1 SELLER DISCLOSURES. The Seller will deliver to the Buyer the following Seller Disclosures no later than
the number of calendar days indicated below which shall be days after Acceptance:
(days)
a (a) a Seller Property Condition Disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller:
a (b) a commitment of the policy to title insurance required under Section 6, to be issued
by the title insurance company chosen by Seller, including copies of all documents listed
as Exceptions on the Commitment:
a (c) a copy of all loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber
the Property after Closing:
a (d) a copy of all leases and rental agreements now in effect with regard to the Property
together with a current rent roll:
a (e) operating statements of the Property for its last
full fiscal years of operation
plus the current fiscal year through
, certified by the Seller or by an
independent auditor:
D (f) tenant Estoppel agreements:

45
10
10

Seller agrees to pay any charge for cancellation of the title commitment provided under subsection (b).
If Seller does not provide any of the Seller Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, the Buyer may
either waive the particular Seller Disclosure requirement by taking no timely action, or the Buyer may notify the Seller,
in writing, within 10
calendar days after the expiration of the particular disclosure time period that the Seller is in
Default under this Contract and the remedies under Section 16 are at the Buyer's disposal. The holder of the Earnest
Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to the Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit
without the requirement of further written authorization from the Seller.
7.2 BUYER UNDERTAKINGS. The Buyer agrees to:
a (a) Apply for approval of the assumption or funding of the loan proceeds described in Section 2 by completing,
signing, and delivering to the Lender the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender and
by paying all fees as required by the Lender (including appraisal fee) no later than
calendar days after
Acceptance; and
a (b) No later than
calendar days after Acceptance, obtain from the Lender to whom application is made
under subsection (a) a written commitment to approve the assumption of the existing loan or to fund the new loan
subject only to changes of conditions in Buyer's credit worthiness and to normal loan closing procedures; or, if
Buyer elects, providing Seller with absolute assurance, within the same time frame, that the proceeds required
for funding the Total Purchase Price are available.
These Buyer Undertakings are at the sole expense of the Buyer and are material elements of this Contract for the
C:\MyFiles\REPC\s.jordan hoffman.wpd
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benefit o* both the Buyer and the Se
If Buyer does not initiate any . -/er Undertaking and provide Seller with v .en confirmation in the time agreed
above, the Seller may either waive the particular Buyer Undertaking requirement by taking no timely action of the Seller
may notify the Buyer in wntmg within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the particular undertaking time period that
the Buyer is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 are at the Seller's disposal The
holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Sellers written notice, deliver to the Se'ler the
Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of further written authorization from the Buyer
7.3 ADDITIONAL DUE DILIGENCE. The Buyer shall undertake the following Additional Due Diligence
elements at its own expense and for its own benefit for the purpose of complying with the Contingencies under Section
8
a (a) Ordering and obtaining an appraisal of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 7 2,
a (b) Ordering and obtaining a survey of the Property if one is not otheiv/ise required under Section 6
a (c) Ordering and obtaining any environmentally related study of the Property,
a (d) Ordering and obtaining a physical inspection report regarding and completing a personal inspection of the
Property,
a (e) Requesting and obtaining verification that the Property complies with all applicable federal, state and local
laws, ordinance and regulations with regard to zoning and permissible use of the Property
Seller agrees to cooperate fully with Buyer's completing these Due Diligence matters and to make the Property available
as reasonable and necessary for the same
8.
CONTINGENCIES: This offer is subject to the Buyer's approving, in its sole discretion, the Seller Disclosures,
the Buyer Undertakings and Additional Due Diligence matters in Section 7 However, the Buyer's discretion in
approving the terms of the loan under subsection 7 2 (b) is subject to Buyer's covenant with regard to minimally
acceptable financing terms under Section 2
8 1 Buyer shall have 55 calendar days after the times specified in Sections 7 1 and 7 2 for receipt of Seller
Disclosures and for completion of Buyer Undertakings to review the content of the disclosures and the outcome of the
undertakings The latest applicable date under Sections 7 1 and 7 2 applies for completing a review of the content of
Additional Due Diligence matters under Section 7 3
8 2 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure, Buyer Undertaking, or
Due Diligence matter within the time provided in Section 8 1% that item will be deemed approved by Buyer
8 3 If Buyer objects, Buyer and Seller shall have
5
calendar days after receipt of the objections to resolve
Buyer's objections Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's objections Likewise, the Buyer is under no
obligation to accept any resolution proposed by the Seller If Buyer's objections are not resolved within the stated time,
Buyer may void this Contract by providing written notice to Seller within the same stated time The holder of the Earnest
Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit
without the requirement of any further written authorization from Seller If this Contract is not voided by Buyer, Buyer's
objection is deemed to have been waived However, this waiver does not affect warranties under Section 10
8 4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 8 3 shall be in writing and shall become part of this Contract
9.

SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES: This offer is made subject to the terms of attached Addendum #ONE

10.
SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES: Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the Property are limited to the
following
10 1 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the
Property in working order and in compliance with governmental regulations,
10 2 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property,
10 3 At Closing, Seller will bnng current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed
in writing by Buyer and will discharge all such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed,
10 4 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code
violation regarding the Property which has not been resolved
11.
VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS: After all contingencies have been removed and
before Closing, the Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine whether or not items
warranted by Seller in Sections 10 1, 10 2, 10 3, and 10 4 are in the warranted condition and to verify that items included
in Section 1 1 are presently on the Property If any item is not in the warranted condition, Seller will correct repair or
replace it as necessary or, with the consent of Buyer and (if required) Lender, escrow an amount at Closing to provide
for such repair or replacement The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection or to claim during the "walkthrough" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1 1 or is not in the condition
C \MyFiles\REPC\s Jordan hoffman wpd
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warranted m Section to, shall constit
Section 10.

i waiver of Buyers nghts under Section '

-nd of the warranties contained in

12.
CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION: Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no
new leases entered into and no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be undertaken without the
written consent of the Buyer.
13.
AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS: If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the
person signing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs
or successors in interest to Buyer or Seller. If the Seller is not the vested Owner of the Property but has control over the
vested Owner's disposition of the Property, the Seller agrees to exercise this control and deliver title under this Contract
as if it had been signed by the vested Owner.
14.
COMPLETE CONTRACT: This instrument (together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller
Disclosures) constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes all prior dealings between the parties.
This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties.
15.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not
limited to the disposition of the Earnest Money Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be
submitted to mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration
Association. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. Any Agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the
mediation shall be binding. If mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies available under this Contract shall
apply. Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller by filing a
complaint with the court, serving the Seller by means of summons or as otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis
pendens with regard to the action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from answering the complaint
pending mediation. Also, the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation.
16.
DEFAULT: If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages
or return the Earnest Money Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults, in addition to the return
of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as liquidated damages a sum equal to the
Earnest Money Deposit or sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages. If Buyer elects to accept the liquidated
damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides
a specific remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be
available under common law.
17.
ATTORNEY'S FEES: In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.
18.
DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY: The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized
by: (a) Sections 7.1, 7.2 and 8.3; (b) separate written agreement of the parties, including an agreement under Section 15
if (a) does not apply; or (c) court order.
19.
ABROGATION: Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not
apply after Closing.
20.

RISK OF LOSS: All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing.

21.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extensions
must be agreed to in writing by both parties. Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date
shall be required absolutely by 5:00 P.M., Mountain Time on the stated date.
22.
COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS: This Contract may be signed in counterparts, and
each counterpart bearing an original signature shall be considered one document with all others bearing original signature.
Also, facsimile transmission of any signed original document and re-transmission of any signed facsimile transmission
shall be the same as delivery of an original.
23.
ACCEPTANCE: Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other;
(a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the
other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
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24.
OFFER AND TIME FOR P
--PTANCE: Buyer offers to purchase tr r
conditions If Seller does not accept o,.~r by 5 00 • AM a PM Mountain Time,
lapse, and the holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall return it to the Buyer.

(Buyer's Signature)

operty on the aoove tenns ana
^bruan/6 , 2002, this offer shall

(Offer Reference Date)

Buyer's Name (please pnnt)

(Notice Address)

(Phone Number)

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER
• Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.

</di/** &tA*tf*

>A/^

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

Seller's Name (please print)

(Notice Address)

(Phone Number)

n Rejection: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.
(Seller's Initials)

(Date)

(Time)

• Counter Offer: Seller present for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or
modifications as specified in attached Counter Offer #
.

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures (One of the following
alternatives must therefore be completed)
A - I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures
SIGNATURE OF SELLER

SIGNATURES OF BUYER

Date

Date

Date
Date
B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing contract bearing all signatures to be mailed on
_, 2002 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the a Seller a Buyer, Sent by
Seller's Initials (

C \MyFiIes\REPC\s Jordan hoffman wpd
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Buyer's Initials (

) Date
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ADDENDUM # ONE
TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
This is an ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date of
February 1 . 2002 including all addenda and counter offers, between C. Kurt Hoffman and John A. Fericks, or their
assigns . as Buyer(s) and Lucy Ann Soffe Trust as Seller(s). The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the
REPC, and to the extent those terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, these shall control. All other
terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same.
1.

Earnest Money:

Buyer shall deposit with Seller an additional $10,000 of non-refundable
earnest money on or before April 6, 2002. If Buyer fails to deliver said
earnest money to Seller by April 6, 2002 Seller may void this contract at its
option. Buyer shall have until April 6, 2002 to conduct its due diligence and
to complete a feasibility study of the site. If Seller has not received written
notice from Buyer of Buyer's desire to void the contract prior to April 6, 2002,
then the original $5000.00 earnest money shall become non-refundable.

Final Purchase Price:

The final purchase price shall be based on a rate of $6.20 per square foot as
determined by a survey of the property. If, however, Buyer chooses to close
on the property prior to August 1, 2002, then the purchase price shall be
based on a rate of $6.00 per square foot.

D Seller a Buyer shall have until
a A.M. a P.M. Mountain Time,
these terms in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC.

:?
D Buyer^SellerSignatu

Date

n Buyer a Seller Signature

Date

_, 2002, to accept

^'Z~

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER
CHECK ONE:
-•cf Acceptance: a Seller a Buyer hereby accept these terms

a Buyer a Seller Signature

Date

a Buyer a Seller Signature

Date

a Rejection: n Seller a Buyer rejects these terms
(Initials)
(Date)

Time

Time

(Time)

a Counter Offer: D Seller a Buyer presents as a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached Counter Offer #_
Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
C KURT HOFFMAN Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
LAW & MOTION

vs.

Case No: 020903870 MI

JOE GOODMAN

Clerk:

Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

J DENNIS FREDERICK
August 19, 2002

cindyb

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RUSSELL
Defendant's Attorney(s): DALE E.
JEFFREY
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count:

C. FERICKS
ANDERSON
WESTON SHIELDS
9:22-10:17

HEARING
Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment or Motion to Dismiss
is argued to the Court by respective counsel and granted for the
reasons stated on the record. Attorney Shields to prepare the
appropriate order.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN FERICKS, et al,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

:

CASE NO. 020903870 MI

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST, et al(
Defendant(s),

Date: September 27, 2002
:

After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice
to Submit for Decision (Defendants' Motion for Protective Order)
filed

September

24, 2002 and Notice

to Submit

for Decision

(Plaintiffs' Objection to Proposed Order on Motion for Summary
Judgment) filed September 24, 2002, the Court rules as follows:
1. Moving Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is granted
for the reasons specified in the supporting memorandum.
2. Plaintiffs' Objection to the Proposed Order on Summary
Judgment

is denied

for

the

reasons

stated

in

the

opposing

memoranda. The Summary Judgment Order accurately reflects this
Court's ruling and is executed September 27, 2002.

Case No. 020903870 MI

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on the 30th day of September, 2002, I sent by
first class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document
to the following:

Jeffrey Weston Shields
201 South Main Street
Suite 600 - One Utah Center
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215

Russell C. Fericks
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, 7th floor
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465

Dale E. Anderson
635 - 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

e^ b
District Court Deputy

F

' l « »«TIUCT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 3 9 2002

JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS, ESQ. (USB #2948)
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP
Attorneys for Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc and
Joe Goodman
One Utah Center - Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215
Telephone: (801) 531-3000

SALT

MKE^OUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOHN FERICKS; and KURT HOFFMAN,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST; CHARLES R.
SOFFE, AS Trustee of the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust
and individually; PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC;
JOE GOODMAN individually, and JOHN DOE
BUYER,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
DEFENDANTS PENTAD,
GOODMAN AND THE SOFFE,
DEFENDANTS, AND DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Civil No. 020903870
Judge Frederick

Defendants.

The Motions of Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman (collectively
"Pentad Defendants") to Dismiss or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment ("Motion for
Summary Judgment"), and the joinder in the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants
Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, Carlos Soffe, Von Soffe and Shirla Holt as trustees (collectively "Soffe

UT_DOCS_A #1113941 v1

Defendants") came duly before the Court for hearing, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
District Court Judge, presiding, on August 19, 2002 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. Pentad Defendants
were represented by their counsel of record, Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. of and for Ballard
Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP. The Soffe Defendants were represented by their counsel of
record, Dale E. Andersen, Esq. of Spencer & Andersen. The Plaintiffs were represented by their
counsel of record, Russell S. Fericks, Esq. of Richards. Brandt, Miller and Nelson, P.C. The
Court, having heard arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the memoranda, affidavits and
other submissions of the parties, and having rendered its ruling from the bench at the conclusion
of the hearing, and being duly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore,
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Pentad Defendants is GRANTED.

2.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Soffe Defendants, by joinder, is

GRANTED.
3.

Based upon the foregoing rulings, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each

and every cause of action thereof, is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
4.

Application for award of attorneys' fees and costs shall be submitted by separate

application in accordance with Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-505.

UT DOCS A #1113941 v1

5.

The Lis Pendens recorded on the title to the property subject of this action by

Plaintiff shall be immediately removed of record.
DATED this j [ | day o f ^ d f e t r 2002

BYTH

UT_DOCS_A #1113941 v1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

slay of August, z<J02, I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

OF

DEFENDANTS

PENTAD,

GOODMAN

AND

THE

SOFFE,

DEFENDANTS, AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT upon the
following addressees by first-class mail, postage prepaid:
Russell C. Fericks
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Dale E. Anderson, Esq.
Spencer & Anderson
635-18 th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN FERICKS, et al,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST, et al,

:

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

:

CASE NO. 020903870 MI

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

Date:

November 26, 2002

Defendant(s),

After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice
to Submit for Decision (Motion of Pentad Defendants for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs) filed November 22, 2002, the Court rules
as follows:
1. Moving defendants' Motion for Award of Fees, etc. is
granted for the reasons specified in the supporting memoranda
excepting point V of the Reply Memorandum.
2. This Court is persuaded the fees requests are reasonable
and necessary for the successful pursuit of the moving defendants'
claims.
3. Counsel for movants to prepare the order and judgment.

Case No. 020903870 MI

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on the 26th day of November, 2002, I sent by
first class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document
to the following:

Jeffrey Weston Shields
201 South Main Street
Suite 600, One Utah Center
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215

Dale E. Anderson
635 - 18:n Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Russell C. Fericks
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465

District Cou

IM^ED ^-ggagr
f J 2002
SALT UKE COUNTY

JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS, ESQ. (USB #2948)
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP
Attorneys for Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc. and
Joe Goodman
One Utah Center - Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215
Telephone: (801) 531-3000

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
JDGMEM7!
DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOHN FERICKS; and KURT HOFFMAN,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST; CHARLES R.
SOFFE, as Trustee of the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust
and individually; PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC;
JOE GOODMAN individually, and JOHN DOE
BUYER.

FINDINGS AND ORDER ON
MOTION OF PENTAD
PROPERTIES, INC. AND JOE
GOODMAN FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
and
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC. AND
JOE GOODMAN FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
Civil No. 020903870

Defendants.
Judge Frederick

The Motion of Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs came before the Court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, for
decision without hearing pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(l)(D).
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The Court reviewed the respective memoranda and affidavits of the parties and rendered its
Minute Entry Ruling on November 26, 2002. Based thereupon, the Court
ENTERS ITS FINDINGS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman are "prevailing parties" against the

Plaintiffs in this action having prevailed on all issues and causes of action by summary judgment.
2.

The Real Estate Purchase Contract subject of this action provides for award of

attorneys fees and costs as a matter of contract.
3.

Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman are entitled to an award of attorneys

fees and costs under the Real Estate Purchase Contract by virtue of the allegations of the
Amended Complaint alleging that Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman were the agents of
Soffe, one of the principal parties to the Real Estate Purchase Contract. Pentad Properties, Inc.
and Joe Goodman were not the agents of Plaintiffs and were not required to have a separate
written agreement with Plaintiffs to recover their attorneys fees in this action.
4.

The legal work on behalf of Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman shown in

the Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Shields was actually performed.
5.

All of the legal work performed on behalf of Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe

Goodman as shown in the Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Shields was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute their case.
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6.

The attorney's billing rates shown in the Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Shields are

consistent with rates customarily charged in this locality for similar services.
7.

There are no additional circumstances which require consideration of additional

factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
8.

Paralegal fees billed by Defendants' law firms may be awarded as attorney's fees

in Utah and are awarded.
9.

Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman may have all of their attorney's fees

awarded without allocation because the entire case was resolved in their favor with a common
defense such that all fees are necessarily allocated to the result.
10.

Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman are the real and necessary parties in

interest with respect to the application for award of attorneys fees despite the fact that counsel
was engaged by an insurer and Pentad Properties, Inc.'s and Joe Goodman's counsel is
authorized to pursue reimbursement of attorney's fees on the insurer's behalf.
12.

Plaintiffs did not bring this action in bad faith, and Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe

Goodman do not, consequently, allege sufficient grounds for an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC. AND JOE GOODMAN AND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS JOHN
FERICKS AND KURT HOFFMAN, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, AS FOLLOWS:
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1.

For the principal sum of Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Nine

Dollars and 52/100 cents ($27,699.52);
2.

For interest on this sum from date of entry of this judgment until paid at the

maximum statutory post-judgment interest rate;
3.

Additional attorney's fees claimed by Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman, if

any, incurred in further proceedings in this action shall be requested in accordance with Rule 4505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
DATED AND ENTERED this llVjday of December, 2002.
BY Ttffi COUR'
f

J. DENNI;
DISTRICT JUDGBI
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the '.-IcJL

day of December, 2002, I caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS AND ORDER ON MOTION OF PENTAD
PROPERTIES, INC. AND JOE GOODMAN FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC. AND
JOE GOODMAN FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AGAINST
PLANTIFFS upon the following addressees by first-class mail, postage prepaid:
Russell C. Fericks
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Dale E. Anderson, Esq.
Spencer & Anderson
635- 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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